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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to present a framework for evaluating arguments in multicultural
argumentative dialogues. In these dialogues there is not a common knowledge to evaluate arguments
because their participants are members of different ethnical and cultural groups. To solve this problem
this paper will propose a multicultural theory of argumentation that will criticize the Blair-Johnson’s
claim (2006) that one of the causes of the fallacies is the ethnocentrism.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to present a framework for evaluating arguments in
multicultural argumentative dialogues (MAD). In this sort of dialogue two (or more)
participants, who are members of different cultural groups, exchange arguments to solve
disagreements, on the basis of their cultural features (Macfarlane 2004). Hence, in
MAD there is not a common ground to evaluate the acceptability of arguments. Each
argument is acceptable in the cultural context of the person who produced it, but not in
the cultural context of his opponent. This is a problem for the theory of argumentation
because it has created a concept of acceptability that depends on the concept of common
ground. But, how to evaluate arguments in dialogues in which there is no a common
ground?
To solve this problem we will study some representative dialogues among
members of Colombian indigenous groups and Magistrates of the Colombian
Constitutional Court. It will be the basis to propose a multicultural theory of
argumentation that will criticize the Blair-Johnson’s claim that one of the causes of the
fallacies is the ethnocentrism (Johnson and Blair 2006, p. 192).
2. TALKING ABOUT CULTURAL DIFFERENCE SERIOUSLY
When a political community legally recognizes the cultural diversity that constitutes its
population, it should determine the conditions under which the different cultures could
live together (Bonilla 2006). This implies a public policy of diversity, a group of rights
that protect minority groups, and a way to solve peacefully conflicts between different
cultures. Hence, the legal recognition of cultural diversity is not only a challenge for
legal pluralism, but is also a challenge for the theory of argumentation (Liu 1999). It
ought to overcome the idea that argumentation across the boundaries of different
Marrero, D. (2007). How to evaluate arguments in multicultural argumentative dialogues? In H.V.
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cultural communities is impossible and should study cases in which it really occurs
(Combs 2004).
We can consider the following example which comes from the Colombian
Constitutional Court (Const. C., T-030/00, Morón). In 1999 a couple of newborn twins,
who were members of a Colombian indigenous community called U’WA, were taken to
the Colombian Family Welfare Institute by their parents. The U’WA marriage couple
requested that this institution had to look after their twins for seven months, while they
consulted their divinities whether it was possible for the twins to live with them.
The reasons that justify this request were the followings: first, if the twins had
come back home, they would have been left to their fate in the Colombian’s jungle. The
U’WA used to believe that the twins were a nature’s imperfection and that they would
have contaminated their community. In the jungle the nature could correct this defect
without damage for the U’WA Community. Second, their divinities spent seven months
to answer all the questions.
The staff of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute rejected the request and
decided to start an adoption process. They justified their decision with three arguments:
first, the twins were “abandoned” by their parents and this allowed starting an adoption
process. Second, the Constitutional Children’s Rights, especially the rights to have a
family (Art. 44, PC) and a decent home (Art. 51 PC), did not allow for the institution to
look after the children. Finally, in accordance with the precedent, the children’s rights
had to been protected quickly. In conclusion, the more suitable alternative was that the
twins were adopted as soon as possible.
According with the theory of typology of argumentative dialogues (Walton
1998; Walton and Krabbe 1995; Woods and Walton 1982), to identify a particular kind
of dialogue it is necessary to distinguish the goals of each participant in it, and the goals
of the dialogue itself, which may differ from those of its participants.
If we take up again the case reconstructed previously, we ought to wonder about
the goals of the twins’ parents and the goals of the staff of the Colombian Family
Welfare Institute. But also, about the goal of the dialogue that was developed by them.
Firstly, both participants attempted to resolve a disagreement through of
exchange of arguments. But they justified their conclusions on their own cultural
features. Therefore, the participants of a MAD try to convince each other of the
acceptability, or unacceptability, of their expressed opinion under discussion, but
without renouncing their cultural features (Marrero 2003).
The main issue in this kind of dialogue is that the acceptability of each argument
depends on cultural-specific beliefs, values and presuppositions of each participant in it,
and not on common ground (Rigotti and Rocci 2005; Siegel 1999). For instance, in the
case that was exposed previously, the U’WA marriage couple’s request only makes
sense in a background in which it is possible to belief that the twins are a nature’s
imperfection. On the other hand, the Colombian Family Welfare Institute decision could
only be accepted in a world in which the protections of children’s rights are a priority.
In conclusion, each participant in this dialogue argue across of boundaries of his
cultural-specific beliefs, values and presuppositions, and tries to persuade his
respondent (who has a different system of cultural beliefs, values and presuppositions)
of the acceptability of his standpoint.
Secondly, MAD allows for the peaceful resolution of disagreements between
members of different cultural groups (Oman 2004). According to the theory of
metaphorical domains to understand argumentative dialogues (Cattani 2005; Lakoff and
Johonson 2003), we should not understand MDA like a ‘war’ in which one of the
participants in the dialogue will be defeated, when a stand point is accepted. On the

2

EVALUATING ARGUMENTS IN MULTICULTURAL DIALOGUES
contrary, we should understand this dialogue as a communicative situation in which the
resolution of the disagreement makes the coexistence between different cultural groups
possible. Therefore, the most important domain in MAD is ‘cooperation’ and not
‘antagonism’ (Grice 1975).
In short, although the goal of each participant in a MAD is to defend his
standpoint through his cultural-specific beliefs, values and presuppositions; the
dialogue’s goal is increasing the understanding and the peacefully coexistence between
cultural differentiated communities.
For these reasons, it is necessary to think about cultural diversity seriously.
When a political community determines the conditions under which the different
cultures could live together, it ought to think about the conditions under which the
members of different cultural groups could resolve peacefully their disagreements
(Marrero 2006). If the theory of argumentation wants to help in this aim, it should think
about a theory of acceptability of argumentation that does not depend on common
ground of arguers. This paper will propose an answer in this way. First, it will rebuild a
theory in which the acceptability of argumentation depends on common ground and will
show its deficiencies to explain the uses of argumentation in MAD.
3. IS ‘ETHNOCENTRISM’ INTRINSICALLY FALLACIOUS?
In accordance with the theory of informal logic prevailing in our tradition, the
acceptability of arguments depends on a set of beliefs, values and presuppositions that
are common between the participants in the dialogue. It means that one argument that is
not made from this common ground is intrinsically fallacious or could produce fallacies,
because the person who made it used assumptions that are not intelligible by his
opponent.
To explain this conception of argumentation we are going to analyze the theory
that was created by Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair in Logical-self defense (2006) to
explain the criterion of acceptability to evaluate arguments, and the concept of
“ethnocentric attitude” as one of the causes of fallaciously reasoning. To do this, it is
necessary that we understand the concept of fallacy that was created by these thinkers.
A fallacy is an “argument that violates one of the criteria a good argument must
satisfy and occurs with some marked degree of frequency” (p. 54). In other words, if an
argument is good, it must satisfy the standards of relevance, sufficiency and
acceptability. On the contrary, if an argument is irrelevant, insufficient and/or
unacceptable, it will be a fallacy.
Due to formal limits of this paper, we could not study each criterion. We are
only going to study the acceptability criterion. Besides, since the sufficiency and
relevancy “both concern the relationship of the premises to the conclusion”, while the
acceptability “concerns the relationship of the premises to the world”; this criterion is
the most important to explain the argumentation in MAD.
When could a good argument be considered acceptable? Johnson and Blair state
that
The basic idea governing the logical acceptability of premises derives from the purpose of
arguments. Their point is to provide grounds (premises) to convince a reasonable person to
accept a claim (the conclusion) that person originally questioned or did not accept (p. 76).

According to this idea, they made two conditions for acceptability of an argument that
we could call the self-defense criterion and the common ground criterion. On the one
hand, an argument is acceptable when the arguer can defend its premises against the
3
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doubts of his opponent. On the other hand, it is acceptable when the opponent does not
offer more objections because he considers that it is not necessary.
Although the self-defense condition generates the commitment to make all
premises necessary to defend the conclusion, it has a limit: the arguer should not get in
to infinite regress. As a consequence, there is a moment in which the arguer has to stop
his self-defense and trusts that the ultimate premises of his argumentation would not be
objected.
Johnson and Blair state that “it is reasonable to accept an undefended premise if
it is generally known to be true, or at least represents shared knowledge, and known to
be shared, by the arguer and the audience” (p. 77). So, the common ground criterion
protects the arguer against the infinite regress thought the common systems of
knowledge, beliefs, values and presuppositions between arguers.
If an arguer does not satisfy one condition of acceptability, his argument will be
a fallacy. But, why do people argue fallaciously? Johnson and Blair answer this
question after studying thirteen different fallacies. According with this theory, many
fallacies are due to ethnocentric attitudes.
The ‘ethnocentrism’, by this standpoint, “is a tendency to see matters exclusively
through the eyes of the group or class with which one identifies and/or is identified” (p.
192). Therefore, groupings like religion, culture, nation, gender, race, and ethnic
background produce ethnocentric commitments in which if something is true by the
group, it suppose that it is also true for others groups.
Clearly, for Johnson and Blair, ‘ethnocentric attachments’ are perfectly
legitimate, indeed they are inevitable. The problem arises when an ethnocentric
commitment produces an attitude in which the members of the group “become blinded
to certain realities, and see only certain sorts of items as evidence, overlooking all
contrary evidence” (p. 192). It makes the arguer becomes prone to fallacious reasoning,
because he does not satisfy the conditions of acceptability of an argument. There is not a
common ground that allows acceptable premises without defense, and the arguer always
has the risk of entering into infinite regress.
The thesis that will be defended in this paper is that Johnson-Blair’s theory of
ethnocentrism is wrong when there are two conditions. First, the arguers are members of
radically different cultural groups. Second, the protection of cultural diversity is a
positive value.
The Johnson-Blair’s theory is right if it is possible to appreciate the reality in
one way. But when this is impossible, the Johnson-Blair’s theory is wrong. To
understand this claim, we are going to study the different cultural variations that could
arise in an argumentative dialogue. There are three grades of cultural difference in
argumentative dialogues: slight, moderate and radical cultural difference.
Firstly, in an argumentative dialogue that has a slight cultural difference the each
arguers belong to different groups that has slight cultural variations, but they understand
the reality in one way. As a result, it is possible to consider some items as reality, and
their participants have to accept some things as evidence. The arguers have a clearly
defined common ground. So, if an arguer ignores this, he will prone to fallacious
reasoning.
Here is an example which comes from Johnson-Blair’s book:
Consider the highly publicized trial in late 1991 of William Kennedy Smith for sexual assault
in Florida. Without entering into the details, we will observe that many people arrived at
conclusions about Smith's guilt or innocence without benefit of the evidence made available
at the trial. A great many women “knew” (read “assumed”) that he was guilty of the sexual
assault; a great many men “knew” that the complainant was fabricating (p. 195).
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Generally, the differentiate gender groups consider one and only one reality. But, the
gender bias could produce argumentation without a carefully study of evidence, they
found their argumentation in gender stereotypes. So, the ethnocentric attitude could
produce fallacies in it.
Secondly, in an argumentative dialogue that has a moderate cultural difference
only some items are considered as evidence and other not. Although in this sort of
dialogue there is not a common ground, there are some things that are accepted as
realities by arguers. If the issue of the discussion is based on this, the ethnocentric
attitude will produce fallacies. On the contrary, if the argumentation’s matter is not
related to share reality, the ethnocentric attitude is a natural behavior.
Johnson and Blair, one more time, could be useful to explain this idea through
this example:
In December of 1991, when he was at Pearl Harbor to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary
of the bombing of that harbor, President Bush is reported to have referred to the United States
of America as “the best country in the world”. This sentiment -often considered patrioticwas also widely expressed during the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf (p. 193).

For Johnson and Blair, such an attitude is ethnocentric because it is impossible to
find evidence that could be used to support that “my country is better than your
country” or that “this is the greatest nation in the world”. But if President Bush had
defended that “In Pearl Harbor many innocent people died”, he could have found an
appropriate evidence to support this claim.
Finally, in an argumentative dialogue that has a radical cultural difference there
is not a common ground at all. Each arguer has a cultural-specific system of beliefs,
values and presuppositions. Therefore, each arguer only appreciates the reality
according to his cultural context.
For example, in 1997 the Colombian indigenous community called Paes was
reported in the Colombian Constitutional Court by one of its members (Const. C., T523/97, Gaviria). This man was found guilty of the murder of another member of his
community, and he was sentenced to sixty lashes by the Paes judicial authorities.
He said this punishment was a ‘torture’, and it was illegal because under
Colombian’s Political Constitution and Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the cruel and inhuman punishments
ware banned. The Paes judicial authorities said this punishment was not a torture; it was
an act of purification. The Paes believed when either of them was lashed, a “ray”
touched him. This magic touch produced two effects. On the one hand, the indigenous
person’s crime is purified by the “ray’s” touch. On the other hand, he could return
peacefully to his community. As a result, the lashes were a “ray” that purified and
allowed pacific coexistence in their community.
In this case, each arguer understood the punishment of lashes in a different way.
On the one hand, it was understood as a torture. On the other hand, it was understood as
a magical purification. The cause of these different points of view was the
ethnocentrism. One arguer understood the punishment from western law. So, the
punishment was only a legal consequence of a crime, and it did not imply corporal
punishments. The other one understood the punishment from the Paes culture.
Therefore, he thought corporal punishment was necessary for the person who was found
guilty because it allowed him to return peacefully to his community.
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Degrees of cultural differences in argumentative dialogues
Radical cultural difference
Moderate cultural difference
Slight cultural difference
C2
C1
C2
C1a
C1
1b
C

C: Culture Context

If MAD’s goal is to increase the understanding and the peacefully coexistence between
culturally different communities, they should be allowed to make arguments from
specific cultural systems. So, the ethnocentrism is right, and the common ground
criterion must be replaced by another that allows for the evaluation of acceptability in
this sort of dialogue.
4. THE ACCEPTABILITY OF PREMISES WITHOUT DEFENSE IN MAD
If we were judges of the Colombian Constitutional Court, we would make a decision
that resolves the conflict between members of radically different cultural groups (like
the U’WA twins and the punishment of lashes), on the basis of the best argumentation.
This decision must improve the understanding and pacific coexistence between
communities that participate in the dialogue. How could we determine what the best
argumentation is? How could our decision contribute to MAD’s goals?
In previous sections we studied that the common ground criterion could not
answer these questions. Premises without defense in MAD could be acceptable not
because these are derived from common ground, but because they are coherent with
beliefs, values and presuppositions of the group or class with which the arguer identifies
and/or is identified. So, we have to replace the common ground with the coherence
criterion.
According to the theory of coherence, we can understand the coherence
problems in terms of “maximal satisfaction of multiple constraints” (Thagard and
Verbeurgt 1997). This could be informally summarized as follows (Thagard 2000 p.
17): 1
1. Elements are representations such as concepts, propositions, parts of images, goals, actions,
and so on.
2. Elements can cohere (fit together) or incohere (resist fitting together). Coherence relations
include explanation, deduction, facilitation, association, and so on. Incoherence relations include
inconsistency, incompatibility, and negative association, and so on.

1

The formal definition of coherence is the follow:
Let E be a finite set of elements {ei} and C be a set of constraints on E understood as a set {ei, ej} of pairs
of elements of E. C divides into C+, the positive constraints on E, and C-, the negative constraints on E.
With each constraint is associated a number w, which is the weight (strength) of the constraint. The
problem is to partition E into two sets, A and R, in a way that maximizes compliance with the following
two coherence conditions:
1. if (ei, ej) is in C+, then ei is in A if and only if ej is in A.
2. if (ei, ej) is in C-, then ei is in A if and only if ej is in R.
Let W be the weight of the partition, that is, the sum of the weights of the satisfied constraints. The
coherence problem is then to partition E into A and R in a way that maximizes W. (The appendix gives a
graph theoretic definition of the coherence problem.) Because a coheres with b is a symmetric relation,
the order of the elements in the constraints does not matter.
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3. If two elements cohere, there is a positive constraint between them. If two elements incohere,
there is a negative constraint between them.
4. Elements are to be divided into ones that are accepted and ones that are rejected.
5. A positive constraint between two elements can be satisfied either by accepting both of the
elements or by rejecting both of the elements.
6. A negative constraint between two elements can be satisfied only by accepting one element
and rejecting the other.
7. The coherence problem consists of dividing a set of elements into accepted and rejected sets in
a way that satisfies the most constraints.

Hence, the problem evaluating the acceptability of arguments in MAD consists of
comparing the premises without defense into accepted and rejected cultural systems in a
way that satisfies the coherence criterion. When premises without defense, and a
specific cultural system fit together, there is a positive constraint between them. So, the
premises should be accepted. But, if they conflict with each other, there is a negative
constraint between them. So, the premises should be rejected.
According to this theory, we need a set of positive and negative constraints to
evaluate arguments in MAD. How can we build these sets? Since the goal of this kind
of conversation is to improve understanding and pacific coexistence between radically
different communities, we ought to use the explanatory coherence criterion (Thagard
and Kunda 1997). 2
This mechanism allows us to understand the premises without defense through
the specific cultural system of the person who offered it. Its elements are the premises
without defense and the propositions that describe the specific cultural system that is
studied. If one of these premises is explained by these group of propositions; so, there is
a positive constraint between them, and they should be accepted. On the contrary, they
should be rejected.
This was the method used by the Colombian Constitutional Court to resolve the
case of punishment of lashes that was rebuilt previously. The decision of the judge, who
was not a member of Paes community, was that the punishment of sixty lashes was not
a ‘torture’, it was a “ray” that purified the indigenous person that was found guilty.
Without entering into specific details, the argument was the following: the
concept of torture was found incoherent with the punishment of lashes. The judge used
the concept of ‘torture’ that was created in the first article of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Under this,
the most important elements of torture were: 3
2

Although Tagart and Kunda (1997) claim that there are three mechanisms to making sense of people:
the stereotypes, the coherence criterion, and the analogical criterion; we only use one of them: the
explanatory criterion. The reason for this decision is as follows:
The stereotypes are not useful to evaluate arguments in MAD because they do not allow the
understanding between different communities, the reinforces the prejudices and could produce fallacies
(Johnson).
The analogical coherence is impossible because between radically different communities, it is
not relevance properties in common. So, the analogy is impossible.
3
The concept of torture that was made in of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was the following:
Article 1: For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing
him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
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1. Torture is any act by which severe pain or suffering, either physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person who has committed or is suspected of having
committed a crime.
2. Torture has the purpose of obtaining information or a confession of the act that
this person has committed or is suspected of having committed.
3. Torture is inflicted by a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.
4. Torture does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.
The punishment of lashes did not share the purposes of the torture. The lashes did not
pretend to obtain information or a confession. Its purpose was to purify and allow the
pacific coexistence in the Paes community. Hence, this concept was a source of
negative constraints and should have been rejected.
On the contrary, the claim that the lashes were a magic purification that allowed
for the pacific coexistence in the Paes community was accepted. It was coherent with
the Paes culture because this community was in a process of transformation in which
the death penalty became forbidden. Before this, each member of that community could
kill any Paes indigenous person as a consequence of a crime. The Paes needed a social
mechanism to punish the crimes committed without death penalty. The lashes were this
mechanism. It allowed for the guilty party to receive a punishment without the risk of
being murdered. Besides, the others members of that community could see that the
crime has been punished.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper suggested a method to evaluate arguments in MAD. The proposal was
simple: when a person, who is a member of a specific cultural community, argues
across his cultural boundaries, his argumentation could be acceptable because it is
coherent with his own culture, and not because it has been derived from a common
ground. This thesis could be the basis to build a multicultural theory of argumentation
that allows for a new understanding of argumentation in multicultural contexts.
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